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ICBC Standard Bank’s participates in $237.6 million repo agreement with Government of Ecuador in 2019

$237.65M USD

Funder ICBC Standard Bank PLC
Recipient Organization Government of Ecuador
Country Ecuador
Start Date May 31, 2019
End Date Jun 11, 2029
Duration 3,664 days
Number of Grantees 1
Roles Recipient
Data Source AidData Chinese Aid
Grant ID 101788
Grant Description

ICBC Standard Bank’s participates in $237.6 million repo agreement with Government of Ecuador in 2019 On August 28, 2018 the Government of Ecuador, represented by the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, and Goldman Sachs International (GSI) entered into a master repurchase (‘repo’) agreement under which the Government of Ecuador sold and transferred to GSI a nominal amount of notes of $1,201,616,000 issued by the Government of Ecuador and in return received from GSI a purchase price of $500,000,000, the value of the Government of Ecuador’s residual interest in the repurchase agreement, and the periodic payment by GSI of amounts equal to the periodic interest amounts on these notes.

The master repurchase agreement was governed by English law and based upon the standard Global Master Repurchase Agreement published by the International Securities Market Association, together with a negotiated annex (the "GSI-Ecuador GMRA") and a confirmation (the "August 2018 Repo Confirmation", collectively with the GSI-Ecuador GMRA, the "August 2018 GSI-Ecuador Repurchase Agreement").

Under the terms of repurchase agreement, upon the scheduled amortization dates, the Government of Ecuador is required to pay amounts in installments to GSI which in the aggregate equal the amount originally paid as the purchase price to GSI.

On the scheduled repurchase date, 48 months from the commencement of the repurchase agreement, GSI is required to sell and transfer to the Government of Ecuador the equivalent property to the original series of notes, transferred against payment by the Government of Ecuador of the final installment of the repurchase price, provided that certain events of default relating to the Government of Ecuador have not occurred.

The repurchase agreement provides that the repo counterparty has the right to sell or otherwise dispose of its ownership interest on these notes, although the repo counterparty has agreed that it will continue to maintain economic exposure to the issued notes during the pendency of the repurchase agreement except in the case of an event of default by the Government of Ecuador.

Under the terms of the repurchase agreement, the Government of Ecuador will repurchase the notes for a price consisting of the amount originally received together with interest agreed as 90-day LIBOR plus 425 basis points, or approximately 6.55%, a savings of approximately 30% compared with the 9.63% yield on the sovereign bond due in 2022.

The Government of Ecuador agreed to classify the notes issued as a contingent liability for accounting purposes in its regular debt reports, and the purchase price received was to be classified for accounting purposes as public indebtedness.

The repurchase agreement was approved by the Government of Ecuador’s Debt and Finance Committee on August 25, 2018, and the transaction fell within the debt-raising parameters contemplated in the annual fiscal planning goals approved by the National Assembly in the Government of Ecuador’s 2018 budget.

The 2018 repurchase transaction sought to increase Government of Ecuador’s short-term liquidity. It was collateralized against a set of sovereign bonds that the Government of Ecuador issued on an ad hoc basis.

On October 10, 2018, the Government of Ecuador and GSI amended and restated the August 28, 2018 repurchase transaction to decrease the price differential spread payable by the Government of Ecuador by 135 basis points (as compared to the price differential spread payable by the Government of Ecuador under the August 28, 2018 repurchase transaction), in exchange for the Government of Ecuador repaying the purchase price in euro based on an agreed upon exchange rate, although the purchase price was disbursed in US dollars.

In accordance with the substitution provisions set out in the amended and restated August 2018 GSI-Ecuador Repurchase Agreement (as amended and restated, the "Amended August 2018 GSI-Ecuador Repurchase Agreement") and pursuant to a notice of substitution dated May 23, 2019, on May 29, 2019: (a) $701,616,000 nominal amount of the August 2018 Additional Notes (comprised solely of 2020 Notes), which had a market value at the date of the notice of substitution of approximately $733.67 million (the "Substituted August 2018 Additional Notes") were returned to the Government of Ecuador by GSI; and (b) $688,268,000 nominal amount of notes of the Government of Ecuador due 2023 with a coupon of 8.750% (with a market value at the date of the notice of substitution of approximately $733.67 million) were transferred to GSI by the Government of Ecuador.

On May 29, 2019, the Government of Ecuador cancelled the Substituted August 2018 Additional Notes.

Then, on May 31, 2019, the Government of Ecuador, GSI and ICBC Standard Bank Plc (ICBCS) entered into an agreement pursuant to which a portion of GSI's interest in the Amended August 2018 GSI-Ecuador Repurchase Agreement was transferred to ICBC Standard Bank Plc.

As a result of a decline in the valuation of the 2022 Notes and the 2023 Notes, GSI made four requests under the Amended August 2018 GSI-Ecuador Repurchase Agreement from November 19, 2019 to November 22, 2019 for the Government of Ecuador to transfer additional payment amounts totaling $167,814,563.08.

These payments were made between November 21, 2019 and November 26, 2019.

After the recovery of the value of the 2022 Notes and the 2023 Notes, these additional payment amounts were returned in full to the Government of Ecuador upon its request.

In April 2020, the Government of Ecuador delivered to GSI an Accelerated Repurchase Notice, pursuant to which GSI returned to the Government of Ecuador 2022 Notes with a nominal value of $400,000,000 and 2023 Notes with a nominal value of $550,614,000, collectively constituting the entirety of the notes delivered to GSI pursuant to the GSI Repo Transaction, and the GSI Repo Transaction and the GSI-Ecuador Repurchase Agreement were terminated.

Following receipt, the Government of Ecuador promptly cancelled such notes and they are no longer outstanding.

In April 2020, the Government of Ecuador also delivered to ICBCS an Accelerated Repurchase Notice pursuant to which (i) ICBCS returned to the Government of Ecuador 2022 Notes with a nominal value of $100,000,000 and 2023 Notes with a nominal value of $137,654,000, collectively constituting the entirety of the notes delivered to ICBCS pursuant to the ICBCS Repo Transaction, (ii) the Government of Ecuador paid ICBCS a return amount of $294,116.23, and (iii) the ICBCS Repo Transaction and the ICBCS-Ecuador Repurchase Agreement were terminated.

As a result of a decrease in value of the underlying notes, upon requests by ICBCS pursuant to the agreement, the Government of Ecuador transferred to ICBCS additional payments totaling a net amount of $72.2 million (after deducting those additional payments returned by ICBCS to the Government of Ecuador) between November 2019 and April 2020.

Following receipt of the notes from ICBCS, the Government of Ecuador promptly cancelled such notes and they are no longer outstanding.

The IMF and World Bank have criticized the Government of Ecuador for its participation in this over-collateralized repo transaction.

According to a 2023 guidance note (entitled "Collateralized Transactions: Key Considerations for Public Lenders and Borrowers") from the IMF and World Bank, "[I]n 2018, Ecuador issued four-year repos with Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse to cover funding gaps during difficult financial conditions. The transactions involved over-collateralizing the amount borrowed with bonds never included in public debt statistics.

The amount of bonds pledged was US$ 2.4 billion against US$ 1 billion received.

Although the repo interest rates were over 300 [basis points] below Eurobond market rates at the time, Ecuador saw the true costs of the repos rise due to margin calls linked to the marking-to-market of the financial collateral.

In May 2020, Ecuador agreed to repay the full repo, so these securities were not included in the eventual restructuring with commercial creditors, but the repayment reduced the country’s foreign exchange reserves."

📋 Staff Comments

1. According to a World Bank report (entitled 'Debt Transparency in Developing Economies'), '[a] repurchase agreement (“repo”) is the sale of securities to a counterpart in exchange for cash, under the agreement to repurchase the same or similar securities at an agreed price in the future. Repos are widely used in money markets including: (i) interbank lending, (ii) central bank open market operations with domestic commercial banks, and (iii) securities dealers to finance their inventories. Starting from the mid-90s, repos have been increasingly used in [low-income countries and developing countries] as they are a safer, more flexible, and often cheaper source of funding than unsecured borrowing for market makers […]. The “price differential” between the price at the start of the transaction and the price at the end of the transaction reflects the interest rate, whilst the “haircut” is the difference between the market value of the securities and the amount of cash lent against their transfer. The haircut depends on a number of variables such as maturity, quality, scarcity value, and price volatility of the underlying collateral; terms of the repo; and creditworthiness of the counterpart [...]. The economic nature of a repo is that of a collateralized loan. The market arrangements for repos, including the payments of margin, the ability to substitute securities, and the retention of market risk by the security provider, support the view that repos should be classified as loans, with the security remaining on the balance sheet of the security provider. However, from a legal perspective, a repo is a true sale/purchase of assets for a purchase price, with an agreement to re-purchase at a price differential; this is different to a loan that bears interest. As a result of this, the “legal owner” of the securities (i.e., the security receiver) in repos may differ from the “economic owner” for statistical purposes (i.e., the security provider). In the absence of adequate disclosure of the collateralization details, this difference may generate severe information asymmetries, particularly when the repo is overcollateralized and the securities used are not marketable. Overcollateralization of repos that utilize the seller’s own securities can lower the cost of borrowing by providing credit protection in case of default. [This report provides] examples of repos that, in contrast to normal repos (which use third party typically high-grade securities), utilized the countries’ own sovereign bonds as collateral for their borrowing with large haircuts. These repos—signed when the borrowers were experiencing difficult financial conditions—gave creditors the right to claim, in the case of default, a larger amount than was lent (i.e., paid as the initial purchase price), thus de facto diluting the rights of other creditors. Such transactions would only be cost-effective if the potential impact of the collateral in the case of a default (e.g., external securities increasing in value) is not observed by other investors. Otherwise, theoretically, their inclusion in the reported debt portfolio should trigger an increase in the cost of future un-collateralized debt.’ See https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/743881635526394087/pdf/Debt-Transparency-in-Developing-Economies.pdf2. According to the World Bank Group's Country Partnership Framework for the Republic of Ecuador for the Period FY19-FY23, '[l]imited access to global financial markets forced Ecuador to tap alternative sources of financing in 2018, but financing prospects improved with the signing of an agreement with the IMF [in early 2019]. The Government [of Ecuador's] financing needs for 2018 (7 percent of GDP - Table 2) were met mainly from sources, such as: (i) repurchase agreements with Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse; (ii) advanced oil sales agreements signed by the previous administration; (iii) the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR); and (iv) short-term borrowing from state-owned enterprises with excess liquidity. The Government [of Ecuador] placed US$ 3 billion in bonds in January 2018 but refrained from accessing markets during the rest of the year in view of high costs and volatility.' See https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/633491560564064529/pdf/Ecuador-Country-Partnership-Framework-for-the-Period-of-the-FY19-FY23.pdf3. GSI's ID number for the 2018 transaction (Código del Acredor) was GSI 500,0 MM. See https://www.finanzas.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2018/10/Deuda-Externa.pdf4. The Government of Ecuador's SIGADE ID number for the 2018 transaction was 28104000. See https://www.finanzas.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2018/10/Deuda-Externa.pdf

📚 Sources & References
  • Debt Transparency in Developing Economies
  • Operaciones riesgosas con Goldman Sachs y Credit Suisse
  • ECUADOR SOCIAL BOND S.À R.L. U.S.$230,961,000.00 2.60% CLASS A SOCIAL NOTES DUE 2035
  • Invitation Memorandum THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR Solicitation of Consents to Certain Amendments to the Bonds of the Republic of Ecuador listed below (collectively, the “Eligible Bonds”) and Invitation to Exchange Eligible Bonds for New Securities of the Republic of Ecuador (the “New Securities”), [Tweet from @DanielaGabor posted 12:52 PM on October 16, 2020 retweeting @RivettiDiego and reading 'similar @Brad_Setser apparently, to Ecuador - though details unclear from that Bloomberg piece (seems ended because Ecuador couldnt meet margin calls?)']
  • Repurchase Agreement Between the Republic of Ecuador and Goldman Sachs International
  • PROGRAMACION PRESUPUESTARIA CUATRIANUAL 2020-2023
  • Repurchase Agreements
  • Confirmado: En abril, gobierno pagó por adelantado más de $936 millones de deuda externa
  • Presentación de Boletín de Deuda Pública Interna y Externa Enero 2021
  • Ecuador aclara la liquidación con Credit Suisse y Goldman por 1.000 millones de dólares
  • Ecuador espera dos créditos por USD 2.400 millones de China Para hacer uso de este contenido cite la fuente y haga un enlace a la nota original en Primicias.ec: https://www.primicias.ec/noticias/economia/finanzas-ecuador-recibira-creditos-china/
  • Así fue la operación del pago de los repos del Ministerio de Finanzas
  • Contrato de Servicios de Soporte y Asesoria Juridica Internacional
  • ARAUZ FIRMÓ EL ENDEUDAMIENTO DE LA PATRIA – PARTE 2
  • COLLATERALIZED TRANSACTIONS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS Loan applications and disbursements are still being received and processed as the projects continue to evolve. Ongoing monitoring and evaluation are in place to ensure project continuity.
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Government of Ecuador

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