Affective Voluntarism and Affective Distance

An agent can be said to have affective distance (AD) at time t with regards to a proposition p, if and only if the affective states (e.g. moods and emotions) held by that agent play no significant role in the formation of the agent’s belief that p at time t.

In the field of aesthetics, some theorists have argued that AD is necessary for the formation of appropriate aesthetic judgements. The assumption made by such theorists is that AD allows one to reason on aesthetic matters more ‘objectively’. But many questions arise.

Some are metaphysical, such as whether there can be objective aesthetic judgements, whereas others are psychological, such as whether affective states are within our voluntary control. Others are normative, and ask in what manner we ought to control our affective states, if indeed we can.

Finally, a meta-philosophical question is raised: is it even coherent to say that we ought to have AD to propositions (particularly if affective states are not voluntary)? Of these questions, the metaphysical ones have received the most attention.

This three-year project will align aesthetics with research in the philosophy of emotions and normativity to focus on the comparatively neglected psychological, normative and meta-philosophical dimensions sketched above.

By doing so, this project will not only lead to results relevant to the metaphysical queries, it will also contribute to the resolution of long-standing issues about appropriate engagement with aesthetic value.