Finality theory claims and incompleteness in contemporary fundamental physics

The project will carry out an investigation into final theory claims in contemporary fundamental physics and relate them to other core characteristics of the field.

A final theory claim asserts that a given theory will never be in need of replacement by a successor theory due to disagreements with empirical data. Final theory claims have been promoted in quantum gravity, most conspicuously in string theory, from the 1990s onwards.

These claims differ significantly from finality claims regarding Newtonian physics or Maxwell’s electrodynamics that were made in the 19th century: unlike the latter, they are concerned with theories or research programs that are in a highly incomplete state. This peculiar situation raises interesting new questions regarding the role of finality in physics.

The project will circle around two core hypotheses:  Final theory claims can be formulated and discussed in a meaningful way in the context of contemporary fundamental physics. Taking them into consideration is of substantial importance for understanding the current state of fundamental physics.

The project will carry out an assessment of the merits and problems of contemporary final theory arguments and discuss their significance for current fundamental physics as well as for some core debates in the philosophy of science.