Analyzing ontological weightiness and its implications in morality

Moral realists argue that certain actions are objectively right or wrong.

In the last two decades, a group of moral realists called "relaxed realists" has emerged who argue that objective moral properties, such as rightness and wrongness, are not "ontologically weighty." Relaxed realists promise to capture the deep appeal of moral realism - there is an objective morality - while avoiding common objections to the existence of objective moral properties, in particular that such properties are too strange to exist.

Yet it is not clear what ´ontologically weighty´ means, and what the difference is between the properties that are ontologically weighty and those that are not.

If it is not clear what ´ontologically weighty´ means, and what the difference is between the properties that are ontologically weighty and those that are not, then it is not clear how we are to understand relaxed realism and the main difference between it and traditional moral realism. Furthermore, it is difficult to assess the full merits of relaxed realism.

Thus, the purpose of this project is to analyze the ontological weightiness of properties and their implications in morality.

In doing so, the project aims to give a clearer and better understanding of relaxed realism and enable a proper assessment of it.