Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Small: ERADICATOR: Techniques for Laser Assisted Side-Channel Attack Monitor & Response

The security of modern electronic systems relies on secret keys and assets stored on secure integrated circuits (ICs). Extracting such information using side-channel attacks would break the security of the entire system. One class of side-channel attacks relies on known laser techniques from the field of IC failure analysis, which makes the contactless probing of on-chip data possible.

These optical probing attacks are so powerful in extracting secrets from computer chips that conventional countermeasures are ineffective against them. It has been demonstrated that these attacks can be accomplished in a matter of days (from initial analysis of IC activity to full data extraction), even with limited knowledge of the chip under attack.

This leaves some of our most critical commercial, industrial, and defense systems vulnerable to intellectual property piracy and sensitive data breaches. Hence, the threats of laser-assisted side-channel attacks warrant an effective response to protect assets stored in ICs. Unfortunately, few countermeasures have been proposed in the academic literature, and none are available commercially.

Those that do exist are not only expensive but are incompatible with current IC manufacturing processes.

This project investigates ERADICATOR, a multi-layer suite of sensors, randomization, and tamper response mechanisms, to avert laser-assisted side-channel attacks. The project's novelties are that ERADICATOR not only revisits traditional design philosophies to build comprehensive and unbreakable protection mechanisms but also draws upon solutions from multiple disciplines, such as physics, IC design, and cryptography.

All layers of the countermeasures will be suitable for application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), but some will also apply to field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). Moreover, this project explores the feasibility of having an open-source simulator for laser-assisted side-channel attacks that all researchers and practitioners can use to assess the security of their designs in the pre-silicon phase, and hence, choose the proper countermeasures.

The project's broader significance and importance are the systematization of knowledge and exploration of novel laser attack countermeasures for electronic systems used in various applications, such as critical infrastructure, autonomous vehicles, aerospace, and defense equipment.

This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.