On the Security of Modern Satellite Communication Systems and Infrastructure

Satellite systems have become crucial to a huge range of applications, and have become cheaper than ever before to launch and operate. This is largely due to a greater availability of off-the-shelf components and commercial launch providers, as well as arrangements like launch vehicle ridesharing. At the same time, attacker capabilities have dramatically increased, particularly due to the widespread availability of cheap Software-Defined Radio (SDR) hardware, making spoofing, replay, and jamming attacks far more feasible.

This presents problems for legacy "Old Space" systems, which do not have sufficient protections against the threat of adversaries equipped with modern radio technology. Other recent shifts in the landscape of the "New Space" industry such as satellite megaconstellations and multi-tenancy also raise interesting questions about whether novel attacks are possible, or how terrestrial protocols might need adapting to work efficiently and securely in large space systems.

This research aims to better unify space systems, providing a more complete understanding of security and countermeasures in Old Space systems and better securing New Space. In this research project we aim to tackle two primary areas of concern. Firstly, we look at the state of security in Old Space systems, and how it has been changed by the recent increase in attacker capabilities.

We demonstrate that these systems are vulnerable to attacks, both at the raw signal level and within the higher layer processing systems. We then look at how these attacks can be more effectively detected and prevented, investigating device fingerprinting using high sample rate radio signals. We also assess how well this could be used alongside other countermeasures to provide an additional level of confidence in message authenticity in both Old and New Space systems.

Secondly, we look at recent developments in New Space systems. We investigate electromagnetic interference attacks on satellites, particularly in the context of multi-tenant satellites and ridesharing, in which an adversary controlling on-board radio hardware could affect components they do not control. We also examine the problems involved with key management and key distribution in large satellite constellations, proposing systems to ensure eventual consistency and minimise the effect of compromised keys through efficient revocation.

This project falls within the EPSRC "Information and Communication Technologies" research area.