Articulation of a Conceptual Framework for the Study of State Sabotage of Nuclear Infrastructure

This research will establish a conceptual framework for examining sabotage of nuclear infrastructure by states, contributing to the study of sabotage and covert action within the field of intelligence studies, as well as to literature on nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation. The framework will provide a structured approach to understanding what is meant by 'sabotage' in the context of attacks on nuclear programmes, why governments have sought - or may in future seek - to sabotage nuclear programmes, the means by which such sabotage has - or may be - carried out, how such sabotage fits into a saboteur's broader security objectives and operations, and how to define 'success' in this context.

This research will be aimed at addressing existing conceptual gaps with the intention of also - indirectly - supporting policy formulation on related issues. The research will rely on a case study analysis to articulate and test the conceptual framework.

Nuclear programmes, and related infrastructure and expertise, have long been targets of state sabotage. Instances have included the targeting by Allied forces and the Norwegian resistance of the Vemork heavy water production facility during World War II (suspected ; Israeli sabotage of reactor cores being manufactured in France for Iraq's Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center; the US-Israeli Stuxnet cyberattack on Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment facility in 2010; and - most recently - penetration of Ukraine's nuclear energy sector by Russia's Special Services.

Despite these - and other - cases of state-directed sabotage of nuclear programmes, there has been limited academic study of the phenomenon as separate from other nuclear safety and security issues and as a distinct tool of state policy.

While the concept of 'nuclear sabotage' is well-established in the nuclear security field, it is a term of art that refers to incidents at nuclear facilities instigated by non-state actors. It does not consider sabotage activity carried out against nuclear facilities by states, which are likely to be shaped by different capabilities and objectives than those of non-state actors.

Some limited and largely dated literature has examined the drivers of military attacks on nuclear facilities. Other work has addressed the targeting of nuclear programmes for espionage - focused largely on the collection of intelligence on the nuclear weapons programmes of Nazi Germany, the US and the Soviet Union during World War II and the Cold War.

While military attack and espionage may be supported by - or auxiliary to - sabotage, they are distinct from the latter as tools of statecraft.

This lack of a conceptual framework for the study of state sabotage of nuclear programmes has meant that much of the work in this space has been reactive - largely focusing on historical analysis of discreet cases rather than on understanding the factors that influence broader thinking on sabotage of similar targets. This in turn risks creating a handicap for policymakers when it comes to identifying circumstances in which sabotage against a nuclear facility may - or may not - be appropriate to achieve a given objective, as well as how to effectively defend against, disincentivise or deter such sabotage.

More generally, the concept of 'sabotage' has also been poorly defined in its broader use within security studies and as a tool of foreign policy and there is currently no definitive conceptual framework for studying the phenomenon - although some nascent efforts have been made. The thesis will thus also build on existing efforts to understand sabotage as a tool of statecraft more broadly.

The high stakes involved in the sabotage of nuclear facilities are likely to amplify many of the factors at play in other forms of sabotage, making the nuclear angle a particularly salient one through which to approach the study of sabotage more broadly.